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Abstract
Recent literature in small business management suggests that small businesses are financially
constrained. They also face challenges of poor financial performance, which leads to their failure.
Literature also shows that family involvement improves small business performance. We asked
research participants consisting of small business owners from India about their beliefs and
perceptions regarding the relationship between non-resident Indian family members (NRIs), financial
support from NRIs, internal financing sources, and the financial performance of small businesses.
Results indicate that the involvement of NRIs as foreign directors, financial support from NRIs, and
internal financing sources improve the financial performance of small businesses in India. Firms with
NRIs are more likely to perform better than without NRIs. Moreover, the influence of NRIs on the
financial performance of small businesses is higher in the service industry than the manufacturing
industry.
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1.

Introduction

It is commonly agreed that small businesses are
financially constrained (Joeveer, 2013) and face the
challenges of poor performance; therefore, it is
important to find ways by which financial challenges
can be minimized and financial performance of small
business firms improved to minimize their failure
rates. The Indian provision of Micro, Small, and
Medium Enterprises Development (MSMED) Act of
2006, classifies the Micro, Small, and Medium
Enterprises (MSMEs) into two categories,
manufacturing and services (Lahiri, 2012).
Small businesses initially are either sole
proprietorships, or partnerships. Even though these
firms continue to operate as either sole proprietorships
or partnerships, the majority of these small businesses
are passed on to descendants or to non-family
members (the voting majority usually remaining in
the hands of family members), so anyone with a
financial interest in these small businesses is called a
shareholder (Gill et al., 2014). On that basis, small

businesses are characterized as a firm in which these
shareholders belong to the same family (who either
live in the same country or abroad) and participate
substantially in the management, direction, and
operation of their firms. Thus, using this shareholder
model, in a small business, the control tends to be in
the hands of the family; including the founders, who
pass on their business to their descendants.
Continuing to label the owners as shareholders, small
businesses are companies in which one family or
more than one family, linked by kinship, close
affinity, or solid alliances holds a sufficiently large
share of risk capital to enable the family to make
decisions regarding strategic management (Gulzar and
Wang, 2010).
In Asian countries, families have unique values,
history, culture, background, unwritten rules, and
communication methods that families use to direct,
manage, and control small businesses (Gulzar and
Wang, 2010; Rouf, 2011). Thus, family members who
live abroad participate in the governance of small
businesses over the telephone, provide financial
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support to small businesses, and visit India from time
to time to make important decisions with the
consultation of members of the board of directors who
are, in the majority of cases, from the same family.
Although previous studies showed that family
involvement improves financial performance of small
businesses (Kim and Gao, 2013), none of the studies
showed the impact of non-resident family members
on the financial performance of small businesses;
therefore, this study addresses this gap in the literature
by showing the impact of non-resident Indian family
members (NRIs) on the financial performance of
small businesses. The definition of NRIs, in the
context of this study, is family members who live
abroad, provide financial support, act as foreign
members of the board of directors, and are involved in
decision making related to small businesses.
Previous studies on the role of foreign
independent directors in firm performance (Masulis,
Wang and Xie, 2012) and the role of family
involvement in small business performance (Kim and
Gao, 2013) failed to show the impact of non-resident
family members (who are also members of the board
of directors) on the financial performance of small
businesses. Since NRIs live abroad, we classify them
as foreign directors. This leads to following research
questions:
Does the presence of NRIs on the board of
directors improve the financial performance of small
business firms?
Do internal financing sources built with the
financial support of NRIs improve the financial
performance of small businesses?
Do the small businesses that have the presence
of NRIs on the board of directors perform better than
the small businesses that do not have the presence of
NRIs?
This research study proposes that the
involvement of NRIs has a strong impact on the
financial performance of small business firms. This is
because NRIs are involved in decision making by
acting as foreign directors and providing financial
support to minimize financial challenges required for
the operations of small businesses. Our results suggest
that the presence of NRIs enable small businesses to
perform better than small businesses without NRIs.
Thus, empirical results of this study support the
hypotheses that the financial performance of small
businesses improve through the involvement of NRIs
directly and indirectly. The present study contributes
to the small business performance literature.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is
as follows. Section two examines the previous
literature and develops hypotheses. Section three
describes the data and methodology used to
investigate our research questions. Section four
discusses and analyzes the empirical results. Section
five concludes and considers the implications of the
findings.

2. Literature Review
Previous studies noted the relationships between
family involvement, new venture debt financing, and
small business success (Chua et al., 2011) but ignored
the role of non-resident family members who play an
important role in small business performance by
providing financial support and by serving on the
board of directors. The findings of Kim and Gao
(2013) suggested that although family involvement in
management has no direct effect on the firm
performance, the relationship between family
involvement and firm performance is more positive
when a firm's support for family-longevity goals is
higher versus lower. The findings of Brenes,
Madrigal, and Requena (2011) suggested that a board
made up of non-family and family members results in
a balance that is very important to dynamic operations
which leads to improvement in small business
performance.
The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling
(1976), which focused on the function of the board,
serves as the basic foundation of the structure of the
board of directors in small business firms (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Based on
agency theory, agency conflict (i.e., conflict between
principal and agent) takes place in corporations
because managers may not work in the best interests
of shareholders to make ‘corporate assets’ productive
and to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Therefore,
including foreign independent directors on the board
of directors can be an effective instrument for
monitoring senior managers and addressing the
agency problem and reducing agency costs (Fama and
Jensen, 1983; Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda, 2010) in
publicly traded firms.
However, the agency problem in small
businesses is insignificant because family members
control the majority of small businesses and they can
increase the benefits of the agency agreement between
owners and managers (Schulze et al., 2003).
According to agency theory, the main contribution of
independent directors is their ability to remain
independent while overseeing operating matters,
protecting the assets of the firm, and holding
managers accountable to the firm’s various key
stakeholders to ensure the future survival and success
of the enterprise (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005).
Similar to agency theory, the contribution of NRIs can
be in the form of participation in important board
decisions to protect the assets of the small business
firms.
Another foundation of the structure of the board
of directors is the stewardship theory of Donaldson
and Davis (1991) which indicated that the motives of
employees should align with the objectives of the
corporation to pursue the interests of the shareholders
(Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory also indicates
that the main role of the board of directors is to advise
and support management by acting as stewards rather
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than to discipline and monitor as agency theory
prescribes (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Pieper et al.,
2008; Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda, 2010). NRIs,
acting as stewards, function as foreign and outside
directors (independent and affiliated). They provide
advice in aligning the interests of managers (who in
the majority of cases are family members) with the
small business organizations and support the board of
directors in making important governance decisions to
improve the prosperity and survivability of the small
businesses. Thus, stewardship theory offers an
alternative explanation for the relationship between
NRIs and firm performance. Arregle et al. (2007) also
argued that family members are sincere about the firm
because it is part of their collective patrimony and is
often the main asset of the family. In addition, both
the agency theory and the stewardship theory indicate
that independent directors exert a positive influence
on firm performance, although the role of the board of
directors is different in each theory.
Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2010) argued that
under agency theory, independent directors monitor
and control insiders and/or the family; and under
stewardship theory, independent directors provide
valuable outside advice and counsel to the firm.
Therefore, both theories apply to the role of NRIs in
the board of directors as foreign independent
directors. Stewardship theory indicates that
independent directors exert positive influence on firm
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). The
findings of Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda (2010) also
indicated that affiliated directors have a positive
influence on firm performance in small business
firms.
Literature also indicates that foreign directors
can be less effective because of geographic distance
and time constraints. Other challenges include being
cut off from local networks and business duties
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), time zone differences,
security concerns, and lack of knowledge about the
country’s accounting rules, laws and regulations,
governance standards, and management methods
(Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012). Based on these
challenges, one may argue that foreign directors
(NRIs in this case) may not be very adept at
monitoring the effectiveness of the corporation, can
lead to greater agency problems between managers
and shareholders, and lead to diminished firm
performance.
CEO duality is a common characteristic for
leadership in small businesses and takes place when
one person holds the positions of Chairman of the
Board and CEO or, at least, is responsible for the
duties usually associated with those positions. Other
family members, including NRI family members,
serve as members of the board of directors to curb
agency problems related to CEO duality as described
by Fama and Jensen (1983). Curbing agency
problems enhances small business performance. Thus,
CEO duality helps in improving the performance of

small businesses and in fact, it leads to better firm
performance than does separate executive leadership
(Gill et al., 2014).
Small businesses often have a smaller board
size, usually between two to four members (Gill et al.,
2014). Amran and Ahmad (2009) argued that firms
with smaller board sizes consistently make better
decisions, which in turn, lead to better performance
relative to firms with the duality of leadership
structure. The responsibilities of the board of directors
include, but are not limited to, making strategic
decisions to mitigate business risk, lowering the cost
of capital, and improving the performance of the firm.
According to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2012), foreign
directors contribute to and improve firm performance
and shareholder value through their advisory role to
make strategic decisions. In small businesses, foreign
directors strengthen corporate governance, which in
turn has a positive impact on the performance of the
firm. Previous studies found that stronger corporate
governance had a positive influence on firm
performance. For example, Kajola (2008) found
positive relationships between board size, CEO
duality, and firm performance. The findings of
Jackling and Johl (2009) supported the findings of
Kajola (2008) in that larger board size positively
influences firm performance in India. Most recently,
Gill et al. (2014) found that stronger corporate
governance positively influences the performance of
small businesses in Canada.
NRIs not only contribute to sound decisions
related to small business firms, but also inject equity
capital into small businesses, which in turn, helps in
building internal financial resources. It is clear from
the findings of The Press Trust of India (2011) that
NRIs invest funds in the Indian economy. Kroll and
Cohen (2013) indicated that small enterprises suffer
from limited access to equity and debt markets.
Therefore, small businesses tend to rely more on
internal financing sources than external financing
sources. Internal sources of funding include funds
from family members (including NRIs) and external
sources of funding include debt capital arranged by
borrowings from banks, friends, and other private
financing sources (Gill et al., 2012). Moreover, small
firms are financially constrained (Joeveer, 2013), are
associated with higher volatility (Bottazzi, Secchi,
and Tamagni, 2014), have low access to bank loans
(Canton et al., 2013), and face tighter pricing terms
and conditions (Drakos, 2013). Therefore, internal
financial resources provided by NRIs and generated
by retained earnings are among the most important
resources of the small businesses that help improve
performance.
Internal financing sources generated by small
business owners and their family members follow the
“pecking order” theory of finance developed by
Myers (1984), which stated that firms use internally
generated funds in the form of retained earnings
before turning to external sources. Yusuf (1995)
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found that initial investment and on-going access to
financial resources are among the most important
factors that affect success in small-scale businesses.
Mallick and Yang (2011), by taking a sample of
11,000 firms from 47 countries over a period of 19972007, found that retained earnings improve firm
performance.
In summary, the theoretical foundation of this
study starts with the agency theory of Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and the stewardship theory of
Donaldson and Davis (1991). NRIs serving as foreign
independent directors assist board members (who are
family members in the majority of cases) in
formulating corporate policies that help monitor
managers to mitigate agency problems and to reduce
agency costs. NRIs, in the context of stewardship
theory, play the role of stewards for their family to
provide advice in aligning the interest of managers
with the small business organization, and support the
board of directors in making important governance
decisions to improve the prosperity and survivability
of the small business firm. Thus, both agency theory
and stewardship theory form the theoretical
foundation of this study. NRIs not only contribute in
board decisions but also inject equity capital into the
small business firms through financial support to
build internal financing sources, which in turn,
improve the financial performance of small
businesses. Therefore, it is theorized that the presence
of NRIs on the board of directors and the financial
support from NRIs to increase internal financial
resources positively affect the financial performance
of the small businesses in India. Hence, it is
hypothesized:
H1: The higher the presence of NRIs on the
board of directors, the better the financial
performance of small businesses.
H2: The financial support of NRIs improves the
financial performance of small businesses.
H3: Firms with NRIs perform better than the
firms without NRIs.
3. Methodology
3.1 Research Design
We collected sample data to examine our hypotheses
by conducting a survey among small business owners
in Punjab, a state that is located in the northwest of
India. These participants are mainly from Punjab and
its surrounding areas including Ludhiana, Malerkotla,
Bathinda, Raikot, Banga, Hoshiar Pur, Kaputhala,
Phagwara, Jalandhar, and Sahid Bhagat Singh Nagar.
We selected Punjab rather than other states of India
for several critical reasons. First, a large number of
residents from Punjab are living or have lived abroad
for many years, and they usually maintain strong
home ties compared to non-residents from other parts
of India (Varrel, 2012). Second, most Punjabi nonresidents are engaged in self-owned businesses

overseas compared to other non-resident Indians, and
thus are capable of guiding their family members in
India.
Since the whole population is “abstract” (i.e., it
is not possible to obtain a list of all members of the
focal population), a non-probability (purposive)
sample was constructed. In a purposive sample,
screening of participants takes place for inclusion
based on criteria associated with members of the focal
population (Huck, 2008). To obtain a reasonable
sample size, we compiled an extensive list of small
business owners’ names and telephone numbers to
distribute surveys and to conduct telephone
interviews. The sample included approximately 700
research participants encompassing Indian small
business owners. We eventually collected responses
from a total of 152 (21.71%) interviewees over the
telephone, through personal visits, and by mail. We
were successful in conducting 17 personal interviews
with NRIs in Canada and USA, and their family
members in India who operate small businesses. We
discarded two of the survey responses due to
inconsistency and incomplete answers. Common
method bias does not appear to be a problem with this
study because, although self-reported, we measured
our variables objectively. Moreover, a factor analysis
(e.g., Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) indicated that
common method bias does not seem to be a concern
for this study in terms of reliability or validity.
3.2 Variables and Their Measurements
We selected several variables common to similar
studies. Further, we limited the total number of
variables due to the relatively small sample size and
for our convenience of conducting surveys over
telephone. To collect raw data for constructing the
variables, we designed the survey questions in such a
way that respondents felt comfortable disclosing some
information with confidentiality. For instance, rather
than asking for a disclosure of actual sales revenue in
recent years, we provided three individual ranges of
sales, such as, total sales of (i) INR 0 – INR 600,000;
(ii) INR 600,001 – INR 900,000, and (iii) more than
INR 900,000 to construct the relevant variable.
Therefore, we based most of the variables discussed
below on ordinal responses.
Financial performance. The definition of
financial performance (FP) for the purposes of this
study is small business owners’ general perception
about the changes in net profit margin, return on
investment, cash flow from operations, and market
value of their small businesses. Following the
definition, we selected four separate components to
measure the FP index. In the survey, we asked all
participants to rate the extent to which they believe
there are changes in (i) net profit margin, (ii) return on
investment, (iii) cash flow from operations, and (iv)
market value of their small businesses. Their
responses were categorized on a five-point Likert
Scale assigning 5 as “Gone up a lot” and 1 as “Gone
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down a lot”. Responses were initially collected for
each of the above four sources of financial
performance. The four measures are highly correlated
with correlation values ranging from 0.85 to 0.87.
Therefore, we constructed a new index by using
principal component analysis (PCA). The FP index
was constructed using the first component which
explains approximately 87.36% of the variation. 2
Non-resident Indians. Non-resident Indians
(NRI) is measured as a categorical variable where NRI
= 1 if any family member of micro-entrepreneurs
lives outside India. Alternatively, NRI = 0 if none of
their family members reside overseas. NRI is the key
independent variable in the empirical model.
Financial support from non-resident Indians.
Financial support from non-resident Indians (FS) is
measured as a categorical variable where FS = 1 if a
small business receives financial support from NRIs.
Alternatively, FS = 0 if a small business does not
receive financial support from NRIs.
Internal financing sources. Internal financing
sources (IFS) measures small business owners’
capacity to invest his or her personal and family assets
into his or her own small business. Respondents were
asked to rate the extent to which they perceive that
they have adequate funds from either personal savings
(IFS1) or family wealth (IFS2). This response is
categorized on a five-point Likert scale, defining five
as very adequate and one as very inadequate. The
correlation between IFS1 and IFS2 is 0.83 (not
reported). Thus, a new index (IFS index) is
constructed based on the first principal component of
the two factors: that is, IFS1 and IFS2.3
Board size. Board size (BS) is a categorical
variable where BS = 1 if a small business had four or
more directors. Alternatively, BS = 0 if a small
business had three or less directors. We created two
dummy variables based on this information for
empirical analyses. For example, we created a dummy
variable, FS1 if the firm had three or less directors
and BS2 if the firm had four or more directors.
CEO duality. CEO duality (CD) is a dummy
variable with assigned value of 1 if a small business
owner/operator is both CEO and Chair of the same
company, or 0 otherwise.
Board meetings. Board meetings (MT) is a
categorical variable where MT = 1 if a small business
had 13 or more board meetings per year.
Alternatively, MT = 0 if a small business had 12 or
less board meetings per year. We created two dummy
variables based on this information for empirical
analyses. For example, we created a dummy variable,
MT1 if the firm had 12 or less board meetings per
year and MT2 if the firm had 13 or more meetings per
year.

2

The eigenvalues of the four principal components are 3.494,
0.234, 0.155, and 0.117, respectively. Factors that have
eigenvalues greater than one are included in the construction
of the component (Kaiser, 1960).
3
The eigenvalues of the first and second principal
components are 1.830 and 0.170, and the corresponding
variances are 91.517% and 8.483%, respectively. As a result,
IFS index is constructed using the first component.

Small business owner experience. A small
business owner’s years of experience, (EXP) is a
categorical variable. During the survey, respondents
selected any one of the four alternative choices, such
as, 1 = 4 or less than 4 years; 2 = 5-9 years; 3 = 10-30
years; and 4 = 31 years and above. Following the
responses, we created four separate dummy variables
including EXP1, EXP2, EXP3, and EXP4,
respectively. As an example, we defined EXP1 as a
dummy variable that is equal to one if an owner of a
small business has experience of zero to four years,
otherwise it is zero.
Education. The education of the small business
owner (EDU) is a dummy variable with an assigned
value of 1 if a small business owner had master’s
degree or higher, otherwise it is 0.
Firm size. Firm size (SIZE) is a categorical
variable. In the survey, we identified three different
firm sizes as follows: (i) firms with sales from INR 0
to INR 600,000, (ii) firms with sales from INR
600,001 to INR 900,000, and (iii) firms with sales
above INR 900,000. During the survey, respondents
choose only one category where the average sale of
their business belongs. For empirical analyses, we
identified these responses as three separate dummy
variables. For instance, if sales lie between INR 0 and
INR 600,000, we defined a dummy variable, SIZE1,
equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, SIZE2 (SIZE3)
is another dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
company’s sales are within the range of INR 600,001
and INR 900,000 (≥ INR 900,000), 0 otherwise.
Number of employees. Number of employees
(EMP) is a categorical variable. Five choices are
given in the survey including one if the number of
employees is between 0 and 4, two for employees
between 5 and 9, three for the range of 10 and 30
employees, four for employees between 31 and 99,
and five for employees equal to or above 100. We
created five dummy variables based on this
information for empirical analyses. For example, we
created a dummy variable, EMP1, if employee range
lies in the first employee group of 0 and 4 employees.
Following the definition of each category of number
of employees, we created the other four dummy
variables, EMP2, EMP3, EMP4, and EMP5.
Industry. We distinguished all small businesses
under two broad categories: manufacturing and
services. Accordingly, we created two industryspecific dummy variables, IND1 and IND2. By
definition, IND1 (IND2) are equal to 1 if a firm
belongs to the manufacturing (services) sector, and
zero otherwise. By including IND dummy, we also
control for industry fixed effects in empirical models.
4. Analysis and Discussion of Empirical
Results
4.1 Empirical Model
NRIs improve the financial performance of small
businesses by serving on the board of directors and by
providing financial support. Thus, NRIs play an
important role, both directly and indirectly, in the
improvement of financial performance of small
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businesses in India. We therefore examined the
relationship between NRI and FP. NRI is considered
as a main explanatory variable in FP. We considered
all other variables as individual control variables. We
estimated the following basic model:
Yi = α0 + α1.NRIi + ∑δijXij + εit

(1)

In the model, i refers to individual small
business, Yi is FP of firm i, and Xij represents
individual control variables (j) corresponding to firm
i. εit is a normally distributed disturbance term. In the
estimated model, α1 measures the magnitude at which
the presence of non-resident Indians help small
businesses in improving FP relative to other
companies without non-resident Indians. We extend
this model by considering a different set of control
variables one at a time. We estimated the coefficient
of variables of the model by applying ordinary least
squares (OLS) method.
4.2 Descriptive Data Analysis
In the dataset, most of the variables, except FP and
IFS indices, are individual dummy variables. The data
exhibits that the distribution of both FP and IFS is
almost symmetrical around their mean values and thus
there is no outlier present in either of these indices.
We examined the differences in variables among
individual firms with and without non-resident Indian
relatives.
We found that financial performance is
significantly higher among small businesses with nonresident Indians. As an example, the mean FP score

among firms with NRIs is 0.39 compared to -0.56 in
the case of firms without NRIs, and their differences
are significant at the one percent level. Likewise, the
mean IFS among firms with NRIs is greater than that
of firms without NRIs (0.28 versus -0.41). This is
because small businesses receive financial support
from NRIs.
We further observed that small businesses with
NRIs, large board size, CEO duality, and a higher
number of board meetings are able to maintain a high
level of financial performance. Likewise, average
years of small business owner’s experience are higher
among those firms that have NRIs compared to other
firms that do not have NRI support. Finally, the results
exhibited that firms with NRIs are a little larger in size
than the firms without NRIs. However, the impact of
NRIs on financial performance differs between service
and manufacturing industries.
The correlation coefficient matrix exhibits that
NRI, FS, IFS, and FP are positively and significantly
correlated (ρNRI, FP = 0.468; ρFS, FP = 0.388; ρIFS, FP =
0.475, all significant at the one percent level),
implying that firms with NRIs, financial support from
NRIs, and high internal financing sources improve the
financial performance of small businesses in India.
Further, the results show a positive relationship
between large board size and FP (ρBS, FP = 0.387),
CEO duality and FP (ρCD, FP = 0.496), higher number
of board meetings and FP (ρMT, FP = 0.327), education
and FP (ρEDU, FP = 0.274), firm size and FP (ρSIZE, FP =
0.266), and number of employees and FP (ρEMP, FP =
0.433), all significant at one percent.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
FP1) Net profit margin
FP2) Return on investment
FP3) Cash flow
FP4) Total market value of small business
IFS1) Personal financial resources
IFS2) Family financial resources
NRI
FS
BS1
BS2
CD
MT1
MT2
EXP1
EXP2
EXP3
EXP4
EDU
SIZE1
SIZE2
SIZE3
EMP1
EMP2
EMP3
IND

Mean
3.75
3.73
3.95
3.72
3.51
3.86
0.59
0.24
0.82
0.18
0.85
0.90
0.10
0.23
0.35
0.01
0.33
0.33
0.11
0.25
0.63
0.56
0.25
0.19
0.33
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Std. Deviation
0.91
1.00
1.02
0.96
0.90
1.04
0.49
0.43
0.38
0.39
0.36
0.30
0.30
0.42
0.48
0.12
0.47
0.47
0.32
0.44
0.48
0.50
0.43
0.39
0.47

Minimum
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Median
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

Maximum
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Notes: Variables include Financial performance of small business (FP), Non-resident Indians (NRI), Financial support from
NRIs (FS), Internal financial sources (IFS), Board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), Number of board meetings per year (MT),
CEO experience (EXP), Education (EDU), Firm size (FS), Number of employees (EMP), and Industry dummy (IND).

Table 2. Comparison of Firms with and without NRIs
Variable
With NRIs Without NRIs
Mean Difference
FP
0.39
-0.56
0.95***
4.08
3.26
0.82***
FP1) Net profit margin
4.12
3.15
0.97*
FP2) Return on investment
4.28
3.46
0.82***
FP3) Cash flow
4.06
3.23
0.83
FP4) Total market value of small business
IFS
0.28
-0.41
0.69***
IFS1) Personal financial resources
3.76
3.15
0.61**
IFS2) Family financial resources
4.12
3.48
0.64***
FS
0.40
0.00
0.40***
BS1
0.75
0.92
-0.17**
BS2
0.25
0.08
0.17**
CD
0.92
0.75
0.17***
MT1
0.85
0.97
-0.12**
MT2
0.15
0.03
0.12**
EXP1
0.16
0.33
-0.17
EXP2
0.37
0.31
0.06**
EXP3
0.02
0.00
0.02
EXP4
0.36
0.30
0.06
EDU
0.38
0.26
0.12
SIZE1
0.06
0.20
-0.14**
SIZE2
0.21
0.31
-0.10
SIZE3
0.73
0.49
0.24**
EMP1
0.42
0.77
-0.35***
EMP2
0.30
0.16
0.14*
EMP3
0.28
0.05
0.23***
IND
0.42
0.21
0.21**
Notes: Variables include Financial performance of small business (FP), Non-resident Indians (NRI), Financial support from
NRIs (FS), Internal financial sources (IFS), Board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), Number of board meetings per year (MT),
CEO experience (EXP), Education (EDU), Firm size (FS), Number of employees (EMP), and Industry dummy (IND). ***, **
and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

548

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 2, 2015, Continued - 5

Table 3. Correlation Table
FP
NRI
FS
IFS
BS1
BS2
CD
MT1
MT2
EXP1
EXP2
EXP3
EXP4
EDU
SIZE1
SIZE2
SIZE3
EMP1
EMP2
EMP3
IND

FP
1
0.468***
0.388***
0.475***
-0.387***
0.387***
0.496***
-0.327***
0.327***
-0.445***
0.062
0.028
0.151
0.274***
-0.404***
0.000
0.266***
-0.501***
0.216***
0.433***
0.051

EXP3
EXP4
EDU
SIZE1
SIZE2
SIZE3
EMP1
EMP2
EMP3
IND

EXP3
1
-0.082
0.041
-0.042
-0.068
0.088
-0.014
0.068
-0.056
0.041

NRI

FS

IFS

BS1

BS2

CD

MT1

MT2

EXP1

1
0.465***
0.337***
-0.211***
0.211***
0.232***
-0.185**
0.185**
-0.200**
0.061
0.096
0.067
0.125
-0.218***
-0.111
0.243***
-0.351***
0.159
0.292***
0.211***

1
0.318***
-0.184**
0.184**
0.145
-0.177**
0.177**
-0.081
0.115
0.207**
-0.099
0.099
-0.152
-0.040
0.136
-0.382***
0.113
0.372***
0.199**

1
-0.245***
0.245***
0.250***
-0.259***
0.259***
-0.096
-0.072
0.071
0.089
0.147
-0.346***
-0.166**
0.378***
-0.512***
0.287***
0.329***
0.237***

1
-1.000***
-0.194**
0.191**
-0.191**
0.088
-0.023
-0.097
0.074
0.000
0.058
0.034
-0.068
0.319***
-0.134
-0.265***
-0.037

1
0.194**
-0.191**
0.191**
-0.088
0.023
0.097
-0.074
0.000
-0.058
-0.034
0.068
-0.319***
0.134
0.265***
0.037

1
-0.075
0.075
-0.406***
0.144
0.048
0.173**
0.093
-0.268***
-0.018
0.193**
-0.254***
0.150
0.150
0.093

1
-1.000***
0.021
0.056
0.039
0.047
-0.141
0.049
0.092
-0.115
0.287***
0.036
-0.411***
-0.141

1
-0.021
-0.056
-0.039
-0.047
0.141
-0.049
-0.092
0.115
-0.287***
-0.036
0.411***
0.141

1
-0.394***
-0.063
-0.383***
-0.146
0.409***
0.051
-0.315***
0.127
-0.088
-0.096
-0.079

EXP4

EDU

SIZE1

SIZE2

SIZE3

EMP1

EMP2

EMP3

IND

1
-0.080
-0.164**
-0.152
0.245***
0.028
0.055
-0.085
-0.020

1
-0.164**
-0.054
0.157
-0.085
-0.077
0.206**
0.190**

1
-0.208**
-0.470***
0.317***
-0.205**
-0.171**
-0.208**

1
-0.766***
0.177**
-0.156
-0.043
-0.379***

1
-0.368***
0.275***
0.151
0.479***

1
-0.646*** 1
-0.540*** -0.274***
-0.313*** 0.120

EXP2

1
-0.085
-0.515***
0.050
-0.128
0.123
-0.027
-0.032
0.006
0.046
0.079

1
0.278*** 1

Notes: Variables include Financial performance of small business (FP), Non-resident Indians (NRI), Financial support from
NRIs (FS), Internal financial sources (IFS), Board size (BS), CEO duality (CD), Number of board meetings per year (MT),
CEO experience (EXP), Education (EDU), Firm size (FS), Number of employees (EMP), and Industry dummy (IND). ***, **
and * imply significance of each mean difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

4.3 Regression Results and Discussion
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of Equation
1. We find that firms with non-resident Indians
perform better compared to those without NRIs. As
shown in model specification I, the coefficient of NRI
is 0.950, significant at the one percent level. In the
following model specifications, we include a set of
control variables one at a time. For instance, in model
specification II, we include financial support from
NRIs (FS) and firm’s internal source of financing
(IFS), and then we include BS, CD, and MT2 in
model specification III and so forth. Regardless of
individual model specifications, we find a significant
and positive coefficient of NRI, suggesting that firms
with NRIs perform better compared to those without
NRIs. This finding remains robust when we consider
all control variables together (refer to model
specification IV).
The results exhibit that financial support from
NRIs, board size, CEO duality, and higher number of
board meetings per year improves the financial
performance of small business. The findings show
that as firm’s size increases, financial performance of
the small business improves. Increase in size of a

small business signals positive growth. In model
specification IV, the coefficient of EXP4 is 0.308,
significant at the five percent level. Likewise, the
evidence shows that education level of small business
owners and increases in the number of employees
improve the financial performance of small
businesses. As an example, the coefficient of EDU in
model specification IV is 0.383, significant at the five
percent level. The findings in appendix B show that
education and experience of NRIs and their financial
support and participation in the board decisions
improve the financial performance of small
businesses in India.
Table 4 also shows the coefficient of NRI is
1.080 and 0.690, significant at the one percent level in
the service and manufacturing industries respectively
(refer to model specification I in service and
manufacturing industries). In model specification II of
the service industry, we find a significant and positive
coefficients of NRI, IFS, CD, EXP4, EDU, SIZE2,
and EMP3; in specification model II of the
manufacturing industry, we find a significant and
positive coefficients of BS2, CD, MT2, SIZE2, SIZE3,
EMP2, and EMP3. These findings suggest that small
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business service firms with NRIs perform better
compared to those manufacturing firms with NRIs.
Table 4. Effects of NRIs on Financial Performance
Overall Results
Service Industry
Manufacturing Industry
I
II
III
IV
I
II
I
II
0.950*** 0.583***
0.403**
0.317**
1.080***
0.392**
0.690**
0.004
(6.44)
(3.71)
(2.92)
(2.54)
(6.14)
(2.56)
(2.37)
(0.02)
FS
0.348*
0.286*
0.246*
0.344
0.149
(1.94)
(1.84)
(1.67)
(1.60)
(0.73)
IFS
0.331***
0.201**
0.098
0.183**
-0.051
(4.58)
(3.08)
(1.51)
(2.23)
(-0.46)
BS2
0.461**
0.427**
0.306
0.459**
(2.91)
(2.93)
(1.51)
(2.07)
CD
0.946***
0.702***
0.602**
1.356***
(5.51)
(4.31)
(3.06)
(4.33)
MT2
0.521**
0.399**
0.310
0.565*
(2.58)
(2.09)
(1.02)
(1.94)
EXP2
0.137
0.157
-0.075
(0.98)
(0.90)
(-0.34)
EXP3
-0.207
0.217
-0.496
(-0.44)
(0.31)
(-0.77)
EXP4
0.308**
0.332*
0.117
(2.12)
(1.79)
(0.50)
EDU
0.383**
0.456**
0.032
(3.35)
(2.85)
(0.17)
SIZE2
0.471**
0.356*
2.023**
(2.40)
(1.69)
(2.25)
SIZE3
0.471**
0.353
2.070**
(2.30)
(1.53)
(3.10)
EMP2
0.383**
0.149
0.705**
(2.63)
(0.76)
(3.06)
EMP3
0.610**
0.694**
0.785**
(3.31)
(2.57)
(2.97)
IND
-0.477***
(-3.68)
Constant
-0.563** -0.429*** -1.250*** -1.705***
-0.439*
-3.903*** -0.439*
-3.903***
(-4.96)
(-3.96)
(-7.65)
(-8.83)
(-1.75)
(-5.79)
(-1.75)
(-5.79)
Obs
150
150
150
150
50
50
50
50
χ2-test
41.53*** 26.14***
26.10***
16.60***
5.61**
8.04***
5.61**
8.04***
R2
0.219
0.349
0.523
0.650
0.105
0.7639
0.105
0.7639
Adj R2
0.214
0.336
0.503
0.611
0.086
0.668
0.086
0.668
Notes: In the regression models, the dependent variable is financial performance of small business (FP). Independent
variables include non-resident Indians (NRI), financial support from NRIs (FS), internal financial sources (IFS), board size
(BS), CEO duality (CD), number of board meetings per year (MT), CEO experience (EXP), education (EDU), firm size (FS),
number of employees (EMP), and industry dummy (IND). Coefficients of models are estimated by applying ordinary least
square method. t-statistics are given in the parentheses. ***, ** and * imply significance of each coefficient at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Variables
NRI

5. Conclusion
The small business literature demonstrates how
family involvement improves the performance of
small businesses. This study concentrated on the
impact of NRIs as foreign directors on the
performance of small businesses in India. This study
provides a mechanism through which small business
owners may improve financial performance. The
paper shows that NRIs not only provide financial
support to small business owners but also serve as
foreign directors to improve the financial performance
of small business. Previous study on family

involvement in management by Kim and Gao (2013)
found that although family involvement in
management has no direct effect on firm performance,
the relationship between family involvement and firm
performance is more positive when a firm’s support
for family-longevity goals is higher versus lower. Our
results related to NRIs lend some support to the
findings of Kim and Gao (2013) in that the
involvement of NRIs in management decisions and
their financial support improve the financial
performance of small businesses. The findings of this
study also lend some support to the findings of
Brenes, Madrigal, and Requena (2011) in that the
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involvement of NRIs results in the dynamic operation
of small businesses which leads to improvement in
business performance. In addition, education and
experience of non-resident family members and their
financial support and participation in the board
decisions improve the financial performance of small
businesses.
6. Limitations
This study also relies on the perceptions and
judgments of research participants because we
collected data using surveys and interviews. Not all
family involvements (or NRI associations) are the
same; some NRI families are more involved than the
rest, and some NRI families, by virtue of their wealth
or status can facilitate stronger small business
performance by providing financial support and by
participating in the board of directors as foreign
members.
7. Future Research
Although we have bridged some gaps in the literature,
many questions still remain unanswered. One such
question is to understand how small businesses that
cannot receive financial support from NRIs improve
the financial performance. Since NRI families by
virtue of their wealth or status can facilitate stronger
small business performance by providing financial
support and by participating in the board of directors
as foreign members, we call for a direct and objective
measure of the strength of this involvement in future
research.
References:
1. Amran, N.A. and Ahmad, A.C., 2009. Family business,
board dynamics and firm value: Evidence from
Malaysia. Journal of Financial Reporting and
Accounting, 7(1), pp. 53-74.
2. Anderson, C.R. and Reeb, M.D., 2004. Board
composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500
firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49(2), pp. 209237.
3. Arosa, B., Iturralde, T. and Maseda, A., 2010. Outsiders
on the board of directors and firm performance:
Evidence from Spanish non-listed family firms. Journal
of Family Business Strategy, 1(4), pp. 236-245.
4. Arregle, J.L., Hitt, M., Sirmon, D., and Very, P., 2007.
The development of organizational social capital:
Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management
Studies, 1(44), pp. 73-95.
5. Bottazzi, G., Secchi, A., and Tamagni, F., 2014.
Financial constraints and firm dynamics’, Small
Business Economics, 42(1), pp. 99-116.
6. Brenes, E.R., Madrigal, K., and Requena, B., 2011.
Corporate governance and family business performance.
Journal of Business Research, 64(3), pp. 280-285.
7. Canton, E., Grilo, I., Monteagudo, and Zwan, P.V.,
2013. Perceived credit constraints in the European
Union. Small Business Economics, 41(3), pp. 701-715.

8. Chua, J., Chrisman, J., Kellermanns, F., and Wu, Z.,
2011. Family Involvement and New Venture Debt
Financing. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(4), pp.
472-488.
9. Coval, J. and Moskowitz, T., 1999. Home bias at home:
local equity preference in domestic portfolios. Journal
of Finance, 54(6), pp. 2045-2073.
10. Corbetta, G. and Salvato, C.A., 2004. The board of
directors in family firms: One size fits all? Family
Business Review, 17(2), pp. 119-134.
11. Davis, J.H., Schoorman, D.F., and Donaldson, L., 1997.
Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy
Management Review, 22(1), pp. 20-47.
12. Donaldson, L. and Davis, J.H., 1991. Stewardship
theory or agency theory: CEO governance and
shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management,
16(1), pp. 49-65.
13. Drakos, K., 2013. Bank loan terms and conditions for
Eurozone SMEs. Small Business Economics, 41(3), pp.
717-732.
14. Fama, E. and Jensen, M., 1983. Separation of ownership
and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp.
301-325.
15. Gabrielsson, J. and Huse, M., 2005. Outside’ directors
in SME boards: A call for theoretical reflections.
Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 1(1),
pp. 28–38.
16. Gill, A., Mand, H.S., Sharma, S.P., and Mathur, N.,
2012. Factors that influence financial leverage of small
business firms in India. International Journal of
Economics and Finance, 4(3), pp. 33-45.
17. Gill, A., Flaschner, A.B., Mann, S., and Dana, L.P.,
2014. Types of governance, financial policy, and the
financial
performance
of
micro-family-owned
businesses in Canada. International Journal of Business
and Globalisation, 13(4), pp. 542-558.
18. Gulzar, M.A. and Wang, Z., 2010. Corporate
governance and non-listed family owned business: An
evidence from Pakistan. International Journal of
Innovation, Management and Technology, 1(2), pp.
124-129.
19. Hillman, A.J. and Dalziel, T., 2003. Boards of directors
and firm performance: integrating agency and resource
dependence perspectives. Academy Management
Review, 28(3), pp. 383–396.
20. Huck, S.W., 2008. Reading Statistics and Research. 5th
ed. Boston, MA: Pearson Education.
21. Jackling, B. and Johl, S., 2009. Board structure and firm
performance: Evidence from India’s top companies.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(4),
pp. 492-509.
22. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the
firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.
305–360.
23. Joeveer, K., 2013. What do we know about the capital
structure of small firms? Small Business Economics,
41(2), pp. 479-501.
24. Kaiser, H.F., 1960. The application of electronic
computers to factor analysis. Educational and
Psychological Measurement, 20(1), pp. 141-151.
25. Kajola, S.O., 2008. Corporate governance and firm
performance: The case of Nigerian listed firms.
European Journal of Economics, Finance and
Administrative Sciences, 14, pp. 16-27.
26. Kim, Y. and Gao, F.Y., 2013. Does family involvement
increase business performance? Family-longevity goals’

551

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 2, 2015, Continued - 5

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.
32.

moderating role in Chinese family firms. Journal of
Business Research, 66(2), pp. 265-274.
Kroll, Y. and Cohen, A., 2013. Optimum pricing of
mutual guarantees for credit. Small Business Economics,
41(1), pp. 253-262.
Lahiri, R., 2012. Problems and prospects of micro,
small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in India in the
era of globalization. In paper submitted in the
International Conference on Interplay of Economics,
Politics and Society for Inclusive Growth organized by
Royal College of Thimphu, Bhutan.(October 15 and 16,
2012),
1-11
Available
through:
http://www.rtc.bt/Conference/2012_10_15/6RajibLahiri-MSMEs_in_India.pdf (accessed 23 June
2014).
Mallick, S. and Yang, Y., 2011. Sources of financing,
profitability and productivity: First evidence from
matched firms. Financial Markets, Institutions &
Instruments, 20(5), pp. 221-252.
Masulis, R.W., Wang, C., and Xie, F., 2012.
Globalizing the boardroom –The effects of foreign
directors on corporate governance and firm
performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
53(3), pp. 527-554.
Myers, S.C., 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal
of Finance, 39, pp. 575-92.
Pieper, T.M., Klein, S., and Jaskiewicz, P., 2008. The
impact of goal alignment on board existence and top
management team composition: Evidence from family-

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

influenced business. Journal of Small Business
Management, 46(3), pp. 372-394.
Podsakoff, P.M. and Dennis W.O., 1986. Self-reports in
organizational research: Problems and prospects.
Journal of Management, 12(4), pp. 531–544.
The Press Trust of India, PTI, February 1, 2011. NRI
Investment in India Increasing. Available through:
http://bi.galegroup.com.cyber.usask.ca/essentials/article/
GALE%7CA248143043/737da35678b34899347038dc8
c6141d3?u=usaskmain. (accessed 10 June 2014).
Rouf, M.A., 2011. The relationship between corporate
governance and value of the firm in developing
countries: Evidence from Bangladesh. The International
Journal of Applied Economics and Finance, 5(3), pp.
237-244.
Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H., Dino, R.N., and
Buchholtz, A.K., 2003. Exploring the agency
consequences of ownership dispersion among the
directors of private family firms. Academy of
Management Journal, 46(2), pp. 179-194.
Yusuf, A., 1995. Critical success factors for small
business: Perceptions of south pacific entrepreneurs.
Journal of Small Business Management, 32(3), pp. 6873.
Varrel, A., 2012. NRIs in the city: Identifying
international migrants’ investments in the Indian urban
fabric. South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal,
6,
pp.
1-17
Available
through:
http://samaj.revues.org/3425 (accessed September 29,
2014).

Appendix A
Table 1B. Findings (N = 17)
NRIs
i. Provide financial support to small business owners in India.
ii. Participate in board decisions of small businesses.
iii. Connect small business owners with bankers and politicians.
Note: Perceptions of small business owners
Table 2B. Findings (N = 17)
NRIs
i. Are involved in the similar line of businesses they help in India, and are educated and experienced.
ii. Provide financial support to contribute in internal financial resources of small business owners in
India.
iii. Participate in board meetings and board decisions of small businesses over the telephone and in person,
and provide advice on board decisions.
iv. Improves the financial performance of small businesses.
Note: Perceptions of NRIs.
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